INTRA/DP/DP013Separation of program data
The keeping of the program’s own holdings apart from the systems the organization runs its business on, so that a case file is not reachable by whoever can reach the human resources record, and the stated conditions on which something crosses from one to the other.
| Control | Jurisdiction | Source | What it establishes | Prerequisite or recommendation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Recommended | Germanywhere written | IT-Grundschutz-Kompendium, Edition 2023Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik · read 29 Aug 2026 | What the German federal authority holds to be the state of the art, in numbered requirements, among them the checking of a candidate’s own account of themselves, a logging infrastructure the administrators who run it cannot alter, a regular audit of the detection systems against the state they are supposed to be in, and how evidence is secured. | The collected security relevant data are to be held centrally, as a log server assembly placed in a network segment set up for the purpose, and the administrators who operate it should hold no entitlement to alter or delete what it has recorded. The separation is of the store from the estate it observes and from the people who run that estate. |
| Recommended | United Kingdomwhere written | Employment practices and data protection: monitoring workersInformation Commissioner's Office · read 30 Aug 2026 | What the British regulator expects of an employer that watches its workers, told apart as what an employer must do and what it should, and the conditions it sets on watching them without telling them. | Access to what monitoring produces should be restricted to the people who need it, the most appropriate people to hold it should be identified rather than assumed, and they should be trained to handle it. The security risks of the monitoring itself should be assessed and the measures decided from that assessment. |